

of vaccinations incurred for protection against Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis.

S. 3330

At the request of Mr. JACKSON, the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 3330, a bill to establish a national policy for the management, conservation, use, and development of the Nation's natural resources, to provide for the establishment of a Board on Natural Resources Planning and Policy, and for other purposes.

S. 3449

At the request of Mr. JACKSON, the Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEARSON) and the Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON) were added as cosponsors of S. 3449, a bill to authorize and direct the Water Resources Council to coordinate a national program to insure the safety of dams and other water storage and control structures, to provide technical support to State programs for the licensing and inspection of such structures, to encourage adequate State safety laws and methods of implementation thereof.

S. 3841

At the request of Mr. JANSSEN, the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 3841, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for an estate tax charitable deduction in the case of certain charitable remainder trusts.

S. 3872

At the request of Mr. JAVITS, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), and the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY) were added as cosponsors of S. 3872, a bill to provide for the use of certain funds to promote scholarly, cultural, and artistic activities between Japan and the United States, and for other purposes.

SENATE RESOLUTION 342—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF POLICY OF THE PRESIDENT NOT TO STRIKE DIKES IN NORTH VIETNAM

(Referred to the Committee on Armed Services.)

Mr. TUNNEY, Mr. President, on behalf of Senators CHURCH, EAGLETON, HARRIS, KENNEDY, MAGNUSON, MCGOVERN, PROXMIRE, RUBINOFF, BAYL, and myself, I am submitting today a sense-of-the-Senate resolution which supports the policy set forth by the President on June 29, 1972, that the United States shall not bomb the dikes in North Vietnam. I send the resolution to the desk for appropriate referral.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The resolution will be received and referred.

The resolution reads as follows:

S. RES. 342

Whereas the President has stated on June 29, 1972, that: "The United States has used great restraint in its bombing policies; and I think properly so. We have . . . had orders out not to hit dikes because the result in terms of civilian casualties would be extraordinary. As far as any future activities are

concerned those orders are still in force . . .", and

Whereas it appears that millions of civilian lives are protected by the complicated and ancient system of dams and dikes in North Vietnam, now, therefore be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that, in accordance with the above-stated policy of the President, the United States shall not bomb or otherwise attack by air or sea any dams, dikes, or other hydraulic systems in North Vietnam.

Mr. TUNNEY, Mr. President, it is important to recognize that, since the President announced that policy, the administration has vacillated, equivocated, and altered that position. Yet, it should remain the administration's position, as it is proper and imperative.

Mr. President, no issue facing our Nation is more urgent than the possibility that our bombing may help cause mass floods in North Vietnam in the next month or two.

North Vietnam's dike system protects a rural population of over 10,000,000 people. These dikes run throughout the Red River Valley. Often reaching a height of over 40 feet. If the dikes are breached, if monsoon waters which peak in August break through and floods ensue, millions of civilian could drown or face starvation.

Mr. President, let me emphasize this point as strongly as I can: the lives of millions of human beings are at stake. The bombing of North Vietnam's dikes is not just another part of the Vietnam debate, another political antiwar issue. If these dikes fail, one of the greatest human disasters of the 20th century could result.

We may disagree on whether or not the United States should withdraw totally from Indochina. But there can be no disagreement that every moral and legal tenet we hold dear proscribes any support whatsoever for the bombing of North Vietnam's dikes.

In fairness, Mr. President, another point must also be emphasized. I do not claim that our bombing of dikes has yet caused severe civilian casualties. I do not claim that we have as yet jeopardized the civilian lives which are protected by the dikes.

But I do know, Mr. President, that an unchecked bombing policy threatens to do just that. I do know that the reports by our own Government of our bombing activities in North Vietnam have been conflicting and have not always been accurate.

It is important to adhere to the policy set forth by the President on June 29. But it appears that we are not doing that. The highest officials of the Nixon administration now admit that we are, in fact, bombing North Vietnam's dikes. More important, they have also made it clear that these strikes against the dikes are not mere "accidents," but are, in fact, the inevitable consequences of our overall bombing campaign against the North.

The issue of our bombing the dikes was first raised by North Vietnamese spokesmen during the months of April, May, and June, in which they charged that there had been 18, 46, and 46 raids respectively against the dikes. Many of us, including myself, tended to discount

these reports as possible "enemy propaganda" and did not treat them with a great degree of seriousness.

I personally cannot believe that any attempt would be made to bomb the dikes. I am confident that the policy which had been a part of American foreign policy for the past 10 years will remain a part of that policy and that we would leave the dikes alone knowing that the only thing that could be caused in the way of results from bombing attacks on the dikes would be massive civilian deaths through drowning or starvation at some later point.

Similarly, I and others overlooked a provocative article in the June 7-8 issue of *Le Monde* by Yves Lacoste, a professor of geography at the University of Paris. In this article Mr. Lacoste argued that our bombing could cause flooding by bombing in and around the bases of the dikes without striking them directly.

Then, on June 24, 1972, the first eyewitness report by a western observer of a bombed-out dike emerged. Jean Thoraval, the Agence France Presse representative in Hanoi, reported visiting a Red River dike 14 miles from the city of Nam Dinh. He reported that:

One of the embankments were completely out. Several were gutted, with gaps in the dike itself and hollows, evidently caused by bombs, alongside. Deep cracks were visible everywhere. (New York Times, June 25, 1972.)

This report was dwarfed in importance, however, by an event of the first magnitude which occurred 4 days later. On June 28, 1972, the Swedish Ambassador to Hanoi, Jean-Christophe Oberg, took a step virtually unprecedented for Western diplomats, who traditionally speak out only on issues of direct concern to their countries. Mr. Oberg not only reported witnessing bombed-out dikes directly, he called upon world opinion to mobilize to prevent any further bombing of dikes. Speaking out in the strongest possible language, Ambassador Oberg said:

The greater danger just now is the bombing of dams and locks . . . everyone, even diplomats must react as human beings, particularly those of us who have the advantage of being on the spot. Diplomat or not, I have no intention of witnessing passively what is happening . . . I am not the only one to have seen it. If a catastrophe occurs in a few months, at the time of the monsoon, we shall know who is responsible. But this must not be allowed to happen. The lives of millions of people are in jeopardy, and an unprecedented famine could occur in the north.

Mr. Oberg's appeal to world opinion was followed by another eyewitness report—this one by a journalist for the Swedish television network named Erik Eriksson. Mr. Eriksson's film of a bombed-out dike, presumably the same one seen by Mr. Thoraval, was shown on nationwide television in this country on June 30. The dike had been hit in two places, about 800 yards apart. Significantly, there were clusters of bomb craters at the base of the dike, precisely the kind of bombing which could cause the dikes to crack without direct hits, as predicted by Mr. Lacoste.

On July 1, Mr. Thoraval reported witnessing bomb damage at a different dike,